Joseph Halpern

Mar 1, 2024 | aeaweb.org | Alberto Alesina |Marco Tabellini |Valerio Capraro |Joseph Halpern

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Jan 24, 2024 | arxiv.org | Joseph Halpern

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Dec 22, 2023 | arxiv.org | Joseph Halpern

[Submitted on 22 Dec 2023 (v1), last revised 25 Dec 2023 (this version, v2)] Title:Bounding the Communication Complexity of Fault-Tolerant Common Coin Tossing Download a PDF of the paper titled Bounding the Communication Complexity of Fault-Tolerant Common Coin Tossing, by Ivan Geffner and Joseph Y. Halpern Download PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Protocols for tossing a common coin play a key role in the vast majority of implementations of consensus.

Aug 22, 2023 | arxiv.org | Danny Dolev |Ittay Eyal |Joseph Halpern

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Aug 7, 2023 | eprint.iacr.org | Ittai Abraham |Danny Dolev |Ittay Eyal |Joseph Halpern

Paper 2022/308 Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain Abstract We present $\textit{Colordag}$, a blockchain protocol where following the prescribed strategy is, with high probability, a best response as long as all miners have less than $1/2$ of the mining power. We prove the correctness of Colordag even if there is an extremely powerful adversary who knows future actions of the scheduler: specifically, when agents will generate blocks and when messages will arrive.