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Nov 15, 2024 | 
cato.org | Joshua Shifrinson
Should seeking to prioritize threats to US national security disqualify officials from leading policy positions? The campaign underway to prevent former Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby from gaining a senior position in the Trump administration certainly suggests so. Colby made his name in the first Trump administration working to reorient US defense policy toward competition with China, an effort that has since become widely embraced across the political spectrum.
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Aug 30, 2024 | 
russiamatters.org | Justin Logan |Joshua Shifrinson |Mark N. Katz |Masha Hedberg
Deep into the third year of a devastating war, early optimism that Ukraine could push Russian troops off its territory seems a distant memory, as does Russia’s early ambition to fully subjugate its obstreperous neighbor. Despite an influx of Western weapons and money, Ukraine has been largely forced into a defensive crouch, protecting as much territory as it can while grappling with shortages of manpower and munitions.
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Aug 9, 2024 | 
foreignaffairs.com | Justin Logan |Joshua Shifrinson
For decades, U.S. policy toward Europe stayed the same: Washington anchored itself to the continent via NATO and acted as the region’s main security provider while the European members of NATO accepted U.S. leadership.
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Aug 9, 2024 | 
archive.ph | Justin Logan |Joshua Shifrinson
For decades, U.S. policy toward Europe stayed the same: Washington anchored itself to the continent via NATO and acted as the region’s main security provider while the European members of NATO accepted U.S. leadership.
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Aug 2, 2024 | 
cato.org | Joshua Shifrinson
Yet NATO not only survived the Cold War but expanded into the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet space. Over just 25 years, the alliance doubled its membership roster from 16 to 32 states while adding nearly as much territory that the US was obligated to help protect as the original 1949 alliance.
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May 10, 2024 | 
cato.org | Emma Ashford |Joshua Shifrinson |Stephen Wertheim
The calculation is also complicated by confusion about what the United States is trying to achieve in Ukraine. Some emphasize broad, universal principles such as defending democracy or protecting the international order. These are laudable goals, but they could plausibly produce opposite conclusions: either that universal principles have already been adequately defended—the steep price Russia has paid could dissuade future aggressors—or alternately that Ukraine must score a definitive victory.
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May 9, 2024 | 
foreignpolicy.com | Emma Ashford |Joshua Shifrinson |Stephen Wertheim
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Oct 18, 2023 | 
cato.org | Joshua Shifrinson
In “The Myth of Multipolarity” (May/June 2023), Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth challenge the idea that the United States is in free fall down the great‐power ranks.
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Oct 18, 2023 | 
flipboard.com | Joshua Shifrinson
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Oct 17, 2023 | 
cato.org | Joshua Shifrinson
Respecting these interests would have provided the best chance of creating a Europe whole, free, and at peace, though of course such an outcome cannot be guaranteed. Yet Washington made a different choice. Rather than accept Russia’s key interests, the United States bypassed them: it enshrined an enlarging NATO as the core of Europe’s security architecture, and it offered Moscow various consolation prizes.
