Makoto Watanabe

Dec 5, 2024 | cigs.canon | Makoto Watanabe

We compare Transparency and Privacy in credit markets. A long-lived borrower, who has a risky investment opportunity, seeks loans from a sequence of short-lived lenders. Under Transparency, all the information about the past investment outcomes is shared among the future lenders, which helps the lenders learn the borrower’s type. In contrast, no information is shared under Privacy.

Jun 24, 2024 | preprints.org | Makoto Watanabe

PreprintArticleVersion 1This version is not peer-reviewedVersion 1: Received: 22 June 2024 / Approved: 22 June 2024 / Online: 24 June 2024 (10:47:22 CEST)Watanabe, M. Hemodynamic Evaluation of Coronary Artery Lesions After Kawasaki Disease: Comparison of FFR During Cardiac Catheterization With MFR During 13N-Ammonia PET. Preprints 2024, 2024061579. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202406.1579.v1Watanabe, M.

Jan 31, 2024 | cigs.canon | Makoto Watanabe

This paper examines how monetary expansion causes asset bubbles. Whenthere is no monetary expansion, a bubbly asset is not created due to a hold-upproblem. Monetary expansion increases buyers’ money holdings, and then, dealersare willing to buy a worthless asset from sellers, in hopes of selling it to buyerswho may not know that it is worthless—a bubble now occurs. Keywords: Bubbles, dealers, higher-order uncertainty, money JEL Classification Numbers: D82, D83, D84, E44, E52, G12, G14

Nov 21, 2023 | cigs.canon | Makoto Watanabe |Bo Hu

This article develops a model in which an intermediary uses a supply chain finance (SCF) program to fund suppliers. The SCF program pools liquidity from suppliers and meanwhile provides immediate payment to suppliers with pressing liquidity needs. We show that the intermediary optimally selects not only supplierswith positive profitability but also suppliers with negative profitability who, however, contribute to the liquidity pool.

Jun 14, 2023 | cigs.canon | Makoto Watanabe

This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of a bank’s monetary reserves (a liquidity crisis) occurs endogenously. We show that discount window lending by the LLR is welfare improving but reduces banks’ ex-ante incentive to hold monetary reserves, which increases the probability of a liquidity crisis, and can cause moral hazard in capital investment.