Nathan Barnard

Mar 19, 2024 | lesswrong.com | Nathan Barnard |Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel

Possible Topics Both checked! Extreme percentages for P(Doom) are not epistemically justified Scheduling PreferencesSyncAsyncNotes NathanBarnard Okay Okay Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel Okay Okay Next steps Chat about topic and potential scheduling (tip: when2meet.com is a great scheduling tool) If you agree on something, have your dialogue Edit (remove any side chats like this message, and feel free to request editing services from the LessWrong team, button below) Publish! Can you post the...

Mar 1, 2024 | lesswrong.com | Nathan Barnard

Quick Summary Gives the President wide-ranging powers to strengthen the US industrial base Has been around without changing that much since 1953 Has provisions which allow firms to make voluntary agreements that would normally be illegal under antitrust law Provided the legal authority for many of the provisions in Biden’s recent Executive Order on AI The Defence Production Act The Defence Production Act (DPA) has been reauthorised (and modified) by Congress since 1950, and in 1953 its powers...

Feb 25, 2024 | lesswrong.com | Nathan Barnard

The rate at which China is able to advance towards TAI is a crucial consideration in for many policy questions. My current take is that, without significant political reforms which seem very unlikely while Xi is alive (although considerably more likely after his death,) it’s very unlikely that China will be able to mount a meaningful challenge to AI firms in US and allies in the race for TAI.

Feb 14, 2024 | lesswrong.com | Nathan Barnard

An open question is the degree to which governments can do good technical research, either in-house or commissioned. Some possible ways in which this could be relevant:Evals (although this likely could be contracted in a successful way) More straightforward technical research (do any other safety-research areas use this?